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LAWFARE AND COUNTERLAWFARE: THE DEMONIZATION OF THE 
GITMO BAR AND OTHER LEGAL STRATEGIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
David J. R. Frakt* 
 
If “lawfare” is “the wrongful manipulation of the law and legal 
systems by our enemies to achieve strategic military or political ends” 
against the United States and other democratic allies, then the United States 
needs a “counterlawfare” strategy in response.  This article proposes and 
defines the term counterlawfare as “defensive measures to reduce vulnera-
bilities to the enemy‟s use of lawfare and actions to contain and minimize 
the effectiveness of lawfare, including, but not limited to: preparing the le-
gal battlespace; denying, disrupting, and degrading the enemy‟s ability to 
use lawfare; and delegitimizing the enemy‟s lawfare efforts” and uses the 
concept to analyze the Bush Administration legal strategies in the war on 
terror.  The article analyzes several specific legal actions, including the 
efforts to discredit and malign attorneys who represented Guantánamo de-
tainees, which attacks have continued to come from defenders of Bush-era 
policies. 
 
In dealing with terrorists, our tax dollars should pay for weapons to 
stop them, not lawyers to defend them. 
 
- Senator Scott Brown (R. Massachusetts)1 
 
  
 * The author is an Associate Professor of Law at Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas 
School of Law. The author is also a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve Judge 
Advocate General‘s Corps and previously served as a Defense Counsel with the Office of 
Military Commissions from April 2008 to August 2009. The views expressed herein are 
solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the Air Force or the Department of 
Defense.  
 1 Senator Scott Brown, a Judge Advocate in the Massachusetts National Guard, made the 
comment in his January 10, 2010 special election victory speech. Senator Scott Brown, Re-
publican Mass., Special Election Victory Speech (January 10, 2010), reprinted in Scott 
Brown‟s Victory Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/ 
politics/20text-brown.html. Further, Senator Brown failed to mention that his fellow Repub-
lican Senator and fellow JAG officer Lindsay Graham was the principal architect of the 
Military Commissions Act, which mandates that taxpayer-paid JAGs be provided as defense 
counsel for accused detainees under 10 U.S.C. § 949(c). Id. 
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The habeas lawyers were not doing their constitutional duty to de-
fend unpopular criminal defendants. They were using the federal courts as a 
tool to undermine our military's ability to keep dangerous enemy comba-
tants off the battlefield in a time of war.  
 
- Marc Thiessen2 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
These quotations, one fairly mild, one rather nasty, are examples of 
the campaign to discredit and demonize the Guantánamo (Gitmo) Bar attor-
neys who represented Guantánamo detainees in habeas corpus litigation or 
otherwise participated in court challenges to Bush Administration detention 
policies. This campaign has been going on for some time, reached its apex 
in early March 2010 when some leading conservative commentators rat-
cheted up their rhetoric to unprecedentedly shameful levels.3 The March 
  
 2 Marc A. Thiessen, The “al-Qaeda Seven” and Selective McCarthyism, WASH. POST. 
(Mar. 8, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/ 
08/AR2010030801742.html. 
 3 See Ariel Meyerstein, Note, The Law and Lawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 299, 307 (2007) (noting that politicians, particularly Senator Lindsay 
Graham, employed misleading rhetoric which contributed to the demonization of detainee 
defense lawyers); see also Marc D. Falkoff, Conspiracy to Commit Poetry: Empathetic La-
wyering at Guantanamo Bay, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 3, 13 (2007) (noting poor treat-
ment and demonization of detainee bar in stating, ―We have, in short, been accused of engag-
ing in ‗lawfare,‘ and of thereby waging asymmetric warfare against the United States. Any 
Guantánamo lawyer could forward you a number of emails in which he or she has been 
denounced as a ‗traitor‘ for representing ‗terrorists,‘ or worse.‖); see also Steve Vladeck, The 
War on Lawyers, Continued, BALKINIZATION BLOG (May 25, 2010, 10:25 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/05/war-on-lawyers-continued.html (discussing the proposed 
National Authorization Act for fiscal year 2011 (for example, H.R. 5136) and how it may 
negatively affect lawyers representing Guantánamo Bay detainees); see generally THE 
GUANTANAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW (Mark P. Denbeaux  and Jona-
than Hafetz eds., New York University Press 2009) (discussing the struggles of Guantánamo 
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campaign included an infamous advertisement released by Liz Cheney, Bill 
Kristol, and Debra Burlingame‘s ―Keep America Safe‖ organization, in 
which Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys, who had formerly assisted 
Guantánamo detainees, were called the ―Al-Qaeda 7.‖4 The ad referred to 
the DOJ as the ―Department of Jihad‖ and openly questioned the loyalty of 
those lawyers who represented ―terrorist detainees,‖ asking ―Whose values 
do they share?‖5 The campaign also included opinion articles and inter-
views, including pieces by Ms. Burlingame, Andrew McCarthy of the Na-
tional Review, and Marc Thiessen of the Washington Post, all supported by 
a Fox News ―Investigation.‖6 A common tactic of this campaign to discredit 
  
detainees and the lawyers who represent them); see also David J.R. Frakt, The Difficulty of 
Defending Detainees, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 391, 398–401 (2009) (describing a first-hand ac-
count of the Military Commission‘s unethical and political involvement in Guantánamo 
detainee trials).   
 4 Keep America Safe: Who are the Al Qaeda Seven?, (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=ZIxg7LmlEQg. Ms. Burlingame, one of the video creators, is the 
sister of the pilot of American Airlines Flight 77 which was hijacked and crashed into the 
Pentagon on 9-11. Ms. Burlingame has become an outspoken critic of government policies 
which she considers too soft on terrorists. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Debra Burlingame & Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo‟s Indefensible Lawyers, WALL ST. 
J., (Mar. 15, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704131 
404575117611125872740.html (referring to ―Department of Justice political appointees who 
previously represented or advocated on behalf of terrorists.‖). The Left is embarrassed. It 
senses that the public is no longer buying its bogus narrative about the Gitmo Bar: that they 
are noble attorneys answering the Constitution‘s call in order to protect ‗our values.‘  For all 
the Obama campaign‘s talk about how attorneys who voluntarily rushed to al-Qaeda‘s aid 
were defending our ‗values,‘ the Obama administration now senses the need to hide those 
lawyers. It doesn‘t want to name all of them, it won‘t discuss their role in counterterrorism 
policy, and it certainly doesn‘t want to talk about which terrorists they were helping. Andrew 
C. McCarthy, Why the al-Qaeda Seven Matter, NAT‘L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2010, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229281/why-al-qaeda-seven-matter/andrew-c-
mccarthy. See also Thiessen, supra note 3 (stating that lawyers defending Guantánamo de-
tainees used federal courts to undermine military authority). Despite unassailable evidence 
that the majority of detainees were not terrorists and lacking any evidence that any of the 
lawyers involved represented an actual terrorist, Thiessen refers to Justice Department offi-
cials ―who represented terrorists‖ and ―represented or advocated for terrorist detainees.‖ Id. 
His article grossly distorted the views of one DOJ official, Jennifer Daskal, calling her ―a 
lawyer who advocates setting terrorists free‖ and castigating her for her ―radical and danger-
ous views‖ for the quite mainstream suggestion she made when working for a human rights 
group prior to joining the DOJ (for example, that when there was insufficient evidence to 
charge a detainee with any crime the detainee should be released) Id.; see also Exclusive: 
Marc Thiessen Extended Interview, THE DAILY SHOW.COM, http://www.thedailyshow.com/ 
watch/tue-march-9-2010/exclusive---marc-thiessen-extended-interview-pt—1(discussing 
with Marc Thiessen the treatment of lawyers who represented Guantánamo detainees);  see 
also Marc Thiessen, Where are the Gitmo Goatherds?, WASH. POST., May 31, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/31/AR2010053101702.html 
(―Liz Cheney was right—the folks she dubbed as al-Qaeda lawyers really are al-Qaeda law-
yers.‖); see, e.g., Mike Levine, Exclusive: Unknown DOJ Lawyers Identified,  
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the lawyers representing detainees is to call the lawyers ―Al Qaeda lawyers‖ 
or ―terrorist lawyers,‖ in much the same way that lawyers who represent 
known mafia figures are sometimes called ―mob lawyers.‖ The critics con-
veniently ignore the fact that the overwhelming majority of detainees 
represented by counsel were never even accused of terrorist acts, much less 
proven to have committed them.  
Here is a typical example of such an attack in the conservative 
press, railing against ―Michael Ratner and the lawyers in the Gitmo Bar‖:7  
Lawyers can literally get us killed . . . We may never know how many of 
the hundreds of repatriated detainees are back in action, fighting the U.S. 
or our allies thanks to the efforts of the Guantánamo Bay Bar . . . Allowing 
lawyers to subvert the truth and transform the Constitution into a lethal 
weapon in the hands of our enemies—while casting themselves as pa-
triots—makes a mockery of the sacrifices made by true patriots . . . If 
Sens. Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, chairman and ranking members, 
respectively, of the Senate Judiciary Committee succeed in their plan to 
turn enemy combatant cases over to the federal courts, we will sorely rue 
the day that we eliminated ―lawyer-free zones.‖
8
 
The shameful smear tactics employed by Liz Cheney and her counterparts 
were quickly denounced by mainstream legal organizations and were the 
subject of media analysis for several news cycles.9 Many lawyers, including 
prominent conservatives, were quick to come to the defense of the Gitmo 
Bar.10 Those who criticized the attack ads and defended the work of the 
  
LIVESHOTSBLOG (Mar. 3, 2010, 2:07 PM), http://liveshots.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/03/03/ 
exclusive-unknown-doj-lawyers-identified/ (discussing the recent identity revelation of law-
yers assisting Guantánamo detainees). 
 7 Michael Ratner is the President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which spear-
headed the habeas corpus litigation on behalf of detainees. 
 8 Daniel Halper, Lawfare Warnings, WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM (Mar. 5, 2010, 2:39 PM), 
 http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/lawfare-warnings. 
 9 See Statement of Carolyn B. Lamm, President, Am. Bar Ass‘n Re: Justice Dep‘t Law-
yers‘ Representation of Detainees (Mar. 5, 2010) (―Individuals and organizations conducting 
a witch hunt in order to name names of Department of Justice lawyers who earlier 
represented Guantánamo detainees are showing a profound disregard for a fundamental tenet 
of our justice system and our Constitution: that anyone who faces loss of liberty has a right to 
legal counsel.‖); see also Press Release, NACDL, Don‘t let Politics Weaken the Rule of Law 
Statement of NACDL President Cynthia Hujar Orr (Mar. 16, 2010) (discussing the ―McCar-
thy-style attack campaign‖ waged against the Justice Department lawyers who represented 
Guantánamo detainees); see also Ari Shapiro, “Al-Qaeda 7” Controversy: Destinies and 
Politics, NPR.COM (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
124546087 (stating that attacks on the lawyers who represented Guantánamo detainees un-
dermine the justice system). 
 10 This author is one of those who defended the detainee bar. See David Frakt, In Praise of 
the Gitmo Bar, TRUTH-OUT.ORG (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.truth-out.org/in-praise-gitmo-
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detainee bar included many of the key architects of Bush Administration 
legal policies in the detention and interrogation arena, ―a virtual ‗who‘s 
who‘ of officials who worked on counterterrorism policies under President 
Bush,‖ according to one article.11 For example, former Attorney General 
Michael B. Mukasey noted in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that ―lawyers now 
employed at the Justice Department who, while in private practice, volun-
teered to represent suspected terrorist detainees, or argued legal positions 
supporting various rights of such detainees, have been portrayed as in-house 
counsel to al Qaeda.‖12 He called such attacks ―shoddy and dangerous.‖13 
The Brookings Institution released an open letter signed by several leading 
conservative lawyers.14 The letter decried the ―shameful series of attacks on 
attorneys in the Department of Justice who, in previous legal practice, either 
represented Guantánamo detainees or advocated for changes to detention 
policy‖ calling efforts to ―delegitimize the role detainee counsel play‖ ―un-
just‖ and ―destructive.‖15 
What many of the lawyers critical of Cheney and her ilk failed to 
realize, or at least failed to acknowledge, is that such extreme attacks on the 
character and values of the detainee bar were the logical extension of the 
very policies, positions, and strategies that conservative lawyers had 
created, developed, and supported over the preceding eight years, a strategy 
that I propose to call ―counterlawfare.‖ 
  
bar57583; see also David Frakt, Confessions of a Terrorist Sympathizer, SALON.COM (Mar. 9, 
2010, 12:10 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/guantanamo/index.html?story=/news/ 
feature/2010/03/09/confessions_terrorist_sympathizer (a satirical article inspired by a seg- 
ment on the Rachel Maddow Show in which the author briefly appeared). 
 11 Michael Isikoff, “I was Disgusted,” Says Former Bush Official About Liz Cheney Ad, 
NEWSWEEK.COM (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/2010/03/08/i-
was-disgusted-says-former-bush-official-about-liz-cheney-ad.html. 
 12 Michael B. Mukasey, Why You Shouldn‟t Judge a Lawyer by His Clients, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 10, 2010, at A23. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Statement on Justice Department Attorney Representation of Guantánamo Detainees, 
Brookings Institution (Mar. 8, 2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/ 
0307_guantanamo_statement.aspx (select ―download statement to PDF‖) (signatories in-
clude: Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney, Matthew Waxman, David Rivkin, Lee Casey, 
Philip Bobbitt, Peter Keisler, Bradford Berenson, Kenneth Anderson, John Bellinger III, 
Philip Zelikow, Kenneth W. Starr, Larry Thompson, Charles ―Cully‖ D. Stimson, Chuck 
Rosenberg, Harvey Rishikof, Orin Kerr, Daniel Dell‘Orto, Suzanne E. Spaulding, Frank 
Jimenez and William H. Taft IV); see also Charlie Savage, Bush Official Defends Lawyers 
Under Attack for Detainee Work, THECAUCUS.BLOGS.NYTIMES.COM, (Mar. 4, 2010, 4:26 
PM), http://www.thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/bush-official-defends-lawyers- 
under-attack-for-detainee-work/(discussing Peter Keisler‘s defense of attorneys who 
 represented Guantánamo detainees before joining the Justice Department). 
 15 Statement on Justice Department Attorney Representation of Guantánamo Detainees, 
supra note 14. 
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In this Article, I hope to define the term ―counterlawfare‖ and ex-
plain how the concept can help us to understand much of the legal strategy 
employed by the Bush Administration during the ―Global War on Terror.‖ I 
will begin, in Section II, by explaining the concept of lawfare and its pre-
dominant usage today, as well as exploring several, in my view, misapplica-
tions of the term.  In Section III, I explain my proposed concept of counter-
lawfare. In Section IV, I apply the counterlawfare paradigm to the actions of 
the Bush Administration to see if it can provide a coherent explanation for 
the legal strategy in the war on terror, up to, and including, attacks on the 
character and motives of the Gitmo Bar.  In Section V, I conclude that while 
there may be other compelling explanations, counterlawfare does help to 
explain many, if not all, of the legal strategies deployed by the Bush Admin-
istration.   
II.  LAWFARE DEFINED 
In order to define ―counterlawfare,‖ it is important first to have an 
understanding of the term ―lawfare,‖ a descriptive noun popularized, if not 
actually coined, by now Retired U.S. Air Force Major General Charles Dun-
lap. According to General Dunlap, ―lawfare is the strategy of using—or 
misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an 
operational objective.‖16 ―Lawfare‖ is typically described as a form of 
asymmetric warfare by adversaries of unequal power. According to General 
Dunlap, ―It can be positive or negative.‖17 In other words, in General Dun-
lap‘s view, both the proper use of the law and the misuse of the law to 
achieve operational objectives constitutes lawfare. However, a survey of the 
legal and popular literature reveals that the term is used almost exclusively 
in this second, negative sense. For example, according to an article by Da-
vid B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey in the Wall Street Journal, ―The term 
‗lawfare‘ describes the growing use of international law claims, usually 
factually or legally meritless, as a tool of war.‖18 
In a Spring 2010 speech by Brooke Goldstein, she proposed what I 
consider to be a useful working definition of ―lawfare‖:  
When I say lawfare I denote the wrongful manipulation of the law and le-
gal systems to achieve strategic military or political ends. I emphasize 
wrongful because lawfare is an inherently negative undertaking, it consists 
  
 16 Brigadier Gen. Charlie Dunlap, Remarks at the Keystone Leadership Summit, in The 
Reporter Keystone Edition, at 95 (Oct. 3, 2005). 
 17 Id. 
 18 David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at A11. 
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of the negative exploitation of the law to achieve a purpose other than or 
contrary to that for which the law was originally enacted.
19
 
So, what exactly are the military or political ends pursued by law-
fare? What is it that a military enemy is theoretically trying to accomplish 
through manipulative legal actions? Presumably, if the legal claims are 
weak or meritless, the enemy would not expect to prevail in a court of law, 
so there must be some other objective. General Dunlap describes the pur-
pose of lawfare this way:  
Rather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to destroy 
the will to fight by undermining the public support that is indispensable 
when democracies like the U.S. conduct military interventions. A principle 
way of bringing about that end is to make it appear that the U.S. is waging 
war in violation of the letter or spirit of the law of armed conflict.
20
  
Rivkin and Casey echo this view, asserting that ―Al Qaeda and the Iraqi 
insurgents . . . routinely claim that American forces systematically violate 
the laws of war‖ with the goal of ―undermining America‘s political will to 
win.‖21 
Another commentator has described the lawfare concept a bit more 
skeptically: 
The idea seems to be that weak states or non-state actors could be expected 
to flood our courts with frivolous lawsuits, using the rights traditionally af-
forded by the American legal system to further their hostile ends. As the 
concept has been fleshed out by conservative commentators and some 
academics, the theory goes that ―lawfare‖ would divert commanders‘ at-
tention from military operations, encourage our soldiers to second-guess 
themselves on the battlefield and (perhaps most importantly, though its 
adherents would dispute it) embarrass the United States by providing ter-
rorists with a public relations boon.
22
 
Although ―lawfare‖ was originally intended strictly as a military 
term of art, in recent years the term has been increasingly used outside of 
the military context to refer to what is perceived as vexatious or frivolous 
  
 19 Brook Goldstein, Director of The Lawfare Project, Speech on Lawfare and Combating 
the Goldstone Report, Int‘l and Domestic Legal Recourses: Responding to Lawfare and the 
Goldstone Report (April 27, 2010). 
 20 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Val-
ues in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, 
Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20 
Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
 21 Rivkin & Casey, “Lawfare” Over Haditha, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2006, at A14. 
 22 Marc D. Falkoff, Conspiracy to Commit Poetry: Empathetic Lawyering at Guantanamo 
Bay, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 3, 13 (2007). 
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litigation. For example, Alan Dershowitz and Elizabeth Samson have 
stretched the term to describe libel lawsuits by Islamic charities against pri-
vate entities, particularly news organizations, under the theory that such 
lawsuits are ―brought to silence critics of controversial Islamic organisa-
tions.‖23 Although these authors acknowledge that lawfare is a weapon of 
war, they fail to persuasively link such lawsuits to a specific armed conflict. 
Brooke Goldstein has also strained her own useful definition to in-
clude, under the rubric of lawfare, a wide variety of lawsuits with dubious 
connections to armed conflict: 
[L]awfare techniques include frivolous and predatory libel and ―hate 
speech‖ lawsuits brought against authors, politicians, members of the me-
dia, and even cartoonists who are brave enough to speak publicly about, or 
satirically on, issues of national security and public concern. The tech-
niques also include ―workplace harassment‖ lawsuits against counter-
terrorism experts that brief our military and police officers about radical 
Islam.
24
 
The term has also been used inaccurately to describe the work of 
neutral non-governmental organizations (NGO) dedicated to peace and hu-
man rights.25 Perhaps the most bizarre invocation of lawfare I have seen was 
in an article about the court-martial of U.S. Navy SEALS for abusing a 
prisoner and lying about it.26 The author claimed that this instance of the 
American military holding its own personnel accountable for violations of 
the laws of war was an example of terrorist lawfare.27  
Conservative critics have essentially accused American lawyers 
working on behalf of detainees as engaging in lawfare. For example, when 
lawyers for Ali al Marri successfully challenged the government‘s right to 
detain a lawful resident alien as an enemy combatant, Andrew McCarthy 
was strongly critical of the Fourth Circuit ruling (later reversed en banc), 
  
 23 Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The Chilling Effect of „Lawfare‟ Litigation, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, (Feb. 9, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ 
libertycentral/2010/feb/09/libel-reform-radical-islamic-groups. 
 24 Brooke Goldstein, The Disproportionate Use of Lawfare, HUDSON NEW YORK, (April 5, 
2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.hudson-ny.org/1132/the-disproportionate-use-of-lawfare. 
 25 See Anne Herzberg, Lawfare Against Israel, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2008, (Europe), http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB122583394143998285.html (asserting that a Pales-
tinian NGO engaged in lawfare by filing a lawsuit to obtain arrest warrants in Spain for 
former Israeli army officers). 
 26 See Clare M. Lopez, SEALs Case Shows How Terrorists Use ”Lawfare” to Undermine 
U.S., HUMAN EVENTS (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=35934. 
 27 See Id. 
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writing: ―Strike another blow for lawfare: The use of the American people‘s 
courts as a weapon against the American people.‖28  
Although lawfare is normally considered a tactic of asymmetric 
warfare for use by weak nations or parties against powerful states like the 
United States, the United States has also been accused of waging lawfare. 
For example, Scott Horton, a leading critic of Bush Administration‘s legal 
policies in the war on terror, has described the U.S. legal strategy towards 
detainees and their lawyers as lawfare: 
[U]nder the current administration, those designated as enemies have no 
rights, neither under the laws of war nor under any notion of criminal jus-
tice. A radical rupture has occurred; American legal tradition has been 
swept aside and, with it, long-established precedents for dealing with ad-
versaries in wartime—even those accused of heinous crimes. Nowhere is 
that more clear than in the treatment of the so-called habeas lawyers (so 
named because of their repeated attempts to enforce the rights of their 
clients through the writ of habeas corpus—the legal procedure that allows 
an imprisoned person to test the legality of his detention) who counsel the 
detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 
The habeas lawyers have been tarred with ethnic slurs and accu-
sations of homosexuality, accused of undermining national security, sub-
jected to continual petty harassment. They have also had their livelihoods 
threatened through appeals to their paying clients. These events have been 
reported as separate incidents in the press, but this conduct results from a 
carefully orchestrated Bush Administration policy that goes under the ru-
bric of ―lawfare.‖
29
  
 
David Luban has also used the term ―lawfare‖ to describe the view 
under which ―lawyers opposing the U.S. government are . . . the equivalent 
of enemy combatants‖ because they are ―really waging lawfare against the 
  
 28 See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), rev‟d en banc sub nom; Al-Marri 
v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Andrew C. McCarthy, Lawfare Strikes 
Again, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (June 12, 2007 10:10 AM), http://article.nationalreview. 
com/318385/lawfare-strikes-again/andrew-c-mccarthy (condemning the 2007 decision as 
relying on ―faulty reasoning‖). 
 29 See Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush‟s War on the Rule of Law, HARPER‘S MAG., 
July 2007, http://harpers.org/archive/2007/07/0081595; see also Scott Horton, Lawfare Re-
dux, HARPER‘S MAG., Mar. 2010, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/03/hbc-90006694 
(―The notion of ‗lawfare‘ was previously used to attack lawyers in the United States who 
filed habeas petitions on behalf of alleged terrorists in Guantánamo. These lawyers were and 
continue to be subjected to McCarthyite character assassination as terrorist sympathizers, 
even though about 80% of their clients have turned out not to be terrorists after all.‖). 
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United States.30 He suggests that this view may have contributed to ―the 
persistent harassment of Guantánamo lawyers.‖31 
Although I do not dispute Professor Horton‘s and Professor Luban‘s 
observations about the harassment of the Gitmo Bar, I do not believe ―law-
fare‖ is the most precise term to describe it.32 Rather, I would suggest that, 
in military terms, the campaign against the Gitmo Bar is part of a broader 
―counterlawfare‖ strategy adopted by the Bush Administration and still be-
ing carried out by some of the true believers in the strategy, even though 
they are not necessarily in official positions of authority. 
III.  DEFINING ―COUNTERLAWFARE‖ 
There can be no question that leading architects of the Bush Admin-
istration legal policy strongly believed in the threat posed by lawfare, the 
idea that our enemies would use our legal institutions and our reverence for 
the rule of law as a weapon of war against us. Jack Goldsmith explains in 
his book The Terror Presidency how fear of ―lawfare mischief,‖ especially 
politically motivated international prosecutions under the doctrine of uni-
versal jurisdiction, deeply influenced the thinking of Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and other civilian leaders in the Department of Defense 
(DOD).33 John Yoo, a leading proponent of Bush-era detention policies, 
referred to the use of lawfare in a 2008 column for the Philadelphia Inquir-
er:  
[T]errorists are using our own legal system as a weapon against us. They 
use cases such as [José] Padilla‘s to harass the men and women in our 
government, force the revelation of valuable intelligence and press novel 
theories that have failed at the ballot box and before the president and 
Congress. ―Lawfare‖ has become another dimension of warfare.
34
 
Indeed, as several scholars have noted, the idea of lawfare was ex-
plicitly incorporated into national defense strategy.35 Most obviously was in 
  
 30 David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 2021 
(2008).   
 31 Id. at 2025. 
 32 See generally David J. R. Frakt, The Difficulty of Defending Detainees, 48 WASHBURN 
L. J. 381 (2009) (describing the author‘s experience with the challenges facing those attor-
neys who represent detainees). 
 33 See Jack Goldsmith, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 53–64 (2007). 
 34 John Yoo, Terror Watch: Terror Suspects are Waging „Lawfare‟ on U.S., PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2008, at A15. 
 35 See, e.g., Mark D. Falkoff, Conspiracy to Commit Poetry: Empathetic Lawyering at 
Guantanamo Bay, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC JUST. 3 (2007); Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Ene-
mies Waging War in our Courts?, SLATE (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.slate.com/id/2116169. 
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the March 2005 National Defense Strategy for the United States, which 
stated that ―our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by 
those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial 
processes, and terrorism.‖36 The reference to the use of international forums 
and judicial processes clearly indicates concern over the use of lawfare as 
an asymmetric tool of war. The equation of lawfare with terrorism indicates 
how seriously the Pentagon viewed the lawfare threat. However, to the ex-
tent that lawfare is viewed as a negative concept—as misuse of the law and 
legal institutions—then it would not be appropriate for the United States to 
practice lawfare and incorporate it into our own defense strategy. Rather, we 
would develop a counterlawfare strategy—just as we do not fight terrorists 
with terrorism, but with counterterrorism. Furthermore, if lawfare is a form 
of asymmetric warfare used by the weak against the strong, then the United 
States, as the world‘s lone superpower, would hardly need to engage in it.  
William Eckhardt described the development of the use of lawfare 
and the appropriate response to it in a 2003 law review article:  
[T]he increasing use of the law of war as a weapon against the United 
States by our enemies [has] produced a new method of communicating and 
a healthy democratic public accountability. Although the United States is 
not likely to lose militarily on the battlefield, the United States is far more 
vulnerable in the world court of public opinion. Knowing that our society 
so respects the rule of law that it demands compliance with it, our enemies 
carefully attack our military plans as illegal and immoral and our execu-
tion of those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our vulnerability here is 
what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term our ―center of 
gravity.‖ To counter these attacks our government—and the military in 
particular have developed a mechanism to justify, explain, and account for 
its actions. This change began with a presidential address by President Ro-
nald Reagan when he directed the bombing of Libya in 1983, comparable 
to carefully created governmental policy statements in Britain known as 
―White Papers.‖ The government subsequently has had the discipline to ar-
ticulate the legal and moral justification for our military actions. For the 
military, this means that the warfighters (commanders and operations of-
ficers) must fight the war by day and explain their actions on CNN at 
night. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of 
Staff have become as much public spokesmen as war managers.
37
 
 
In essence, what Professor Eckhardt is describing is a counterlawfare strate-
gy, a plan to combat misleading accusations of illegal behavior. Although 
  
 36 U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
5 (2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf. 
 37 William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword, 4 CHI. 
J. INT‘L L 431, 441 (2003). 
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the term ―counterlawfare‖ does not exist in the defense lexicon, I believe it 
is a potentially useful term.38 Accordingly, I propose the following defini-
tion: 
COUNTERLAWFARE: defensive measures to reduce vulnerabilities to 
the enemy‘s use of lawfare and actions to contain and minimize the effec-
tiveness of lawfare, including, but not limited to: preparing the legal bat-
tlespace; denying, disrupting, and degrading the enemy‘s ability to use 
lawfare; and delegitimizing the enemy‘s lawfare efforts. 
IV.  APPLYING A COUNTERLAWFARE PARADIGM TO THE WAR ON TERROR 
Utilizing the above definition of ―counterlawfare,‖ it is possible to 
see how many actions and decisions of the Bush Administration during the 
war on terror, especially those related to detainees, were consistent with a 
counterlawfare strategy.  
A.  Preparation of the Legal Battlespace 
This phase of counterlawfare involves efforts to procure legal au-
thority for military action, such as a U.N. Security Council Resolution, pub-
licizing the moral and legal basis for the armed conflict itself, and justifying 
actions within the conflict. In the case of the invasion of Afghanistan, the 
preparation of the legal battlefield included an invocation of the right to 
collective self-defense under the NATO Charter and obtaining a Joint Reso-
lution of Congress providing Authorization for the Use of Military Force.39 
It also included the Bush Administration‘s public efforts to explain its basis 
for denying prisoner of war (POW) and Geneva Convention Common Ar-
ticle 3 rights to both Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.40  
B.   Deny, Disrupt, and Degrade 
The Bush Administration took their counterlawfare efforts to the 
extreme by denying detainees all access to lawyers or to courts, and by as-
serting that no laws or treaties, including Article 3, protected detainees,41 
  
 38 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE ARMY & U.S. DEP‘T OF THE NAVY, JP-102, DICTIONARY OF 
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ 
new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
 39 See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107 Cong., 115 Stat. 224 
(2001); Collective Defence, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-85648058 
-8934EDC9/natolive/topics_59378.htm, (last updated Jul. 30, 2010) (―NATO invoked Ar-
ticle 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks against the United States.‖). 
 40 See Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec‘y, Announcement of President Bush's Deter-
mination Re Legal Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/38727.htm. 
 41 See id. 
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President Bush unilaterally declared all Taliban and al-Qaeda to be unlawful 
enemy combatants, denying that they were entitled to any presumption of 
POW status, and asserting that there was no possibility of doubt about their 
status as combatants who were outside of the protection of the Geneva Con-
vention and therefore not entitled to a hearing before a competent tribunal.42  
The choice of detention facility can also be seen as part of the coun-
terlawfare strategy. If the Bush Administration was concerned about the 
enemy‘s ability to hamper the war effort through appeals to legal institu-
tions, Guantánamo was the perfect solution. Indeed, Guantánamo was se-
lected as the site for the military‘s principal interrogation and detention cen-
ter precisely because it was considered to be beyond the reach of any court. 
Equally suitable (and arguably superior) sites, such as Andersen Air Force 
Base in Guam, were rejected specifically because of the possibility of detai-
nee‘s gaining access to courts.43 While this strategy did open the United 
States to severe criticism, it did assure that Guantánamo was able to operate 
with minimal oversight or legal constraints for the first few years of its exis-
tence, until the Supreme Court intervened in the summer of 2004 and or-
dered that detainees be afforded some opportunity to challenge the basis for 
their detention.44 However, even when forced to provide a hearing for detai-
nees, the counterlawfare strategy continued. The rules the Pentagon devel-
oped for these hearings (known as Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRT)) ensured that such hearings were held under strict secrecy and 
without benefit of the assistance of defense counsel.45   
Similarly, when the Bush Administration was forced by a Supreme 
Court decision to provide military commissions providing minimal due 
  
 42 See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Richard Cheney et 
al., Regarding Humane Treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/dia_previous_releases/fourth_release/ 
DIAfourth_release.pdf. 
 43 I was serving as Deputy Chief of International and Operations Law for Pacific Air 
Forces in the Fall of 2001 when the Department of Defense was looking for appropriate sites 
to house detainees. Pacific Air Forces proposed Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. It was 
relatively close to the theater of war, it had a huge airfield, it had extensive infrastructure 
which could be readily converted to a detention camp, and it was considered highly secure 
and easy to defend by virtue of Guam‘s extremely isolated location. The Guam site was 
rejected in favor of Guantánamo primarily because Guam was a U.S. territory with a federal 
courthouse.  See Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 108 (―The Pentagon considered other facilities 
besides GTMO, including military bases inside the U.S. and on the Island of Guam. . . 
.detentions there were more likely to be subject to legal challenges since they were on U.S. 
soil.‖). 
 44 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (2004) (holding that ―the District Court has jurisdic-
tion to hear petitioners‘ habeas challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241‖).  
 45 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy, Order 
Establishing CSRT 7 July 4, 2004, para. C3 available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
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process guarantees, it still sought to limit the involvement of potentially 
meddlesome lawyers in the legislation requested from Congress.46 Although 
Congress had no choice but to provide defense counsel to accused detai-
nees, the Military Commissions Act mandated that military attorneys would 
fulfill that role.47 Foreign attorneys were limited to an advisory non-
speaking role in military commissions.48 Non-U.S. Citizens, even those 
from allied countries admitted to practice in a U.S. jurisdiction, were not 
authorized to appear on behalf of a detainee.49 
With regard to the writ of habeas corpus, the DOJ vehemently de-
nied that detainees had the right to maintain such petitions, appealing every 
ruling to the contrary. When the Supreme Court ruled against the DOJ in 
2004, the Bush Administration sought to undermine, if not completely nulli-
fy, the ruling through creative legislation.50 At the Administration‘s behest, 
Congress assisted in the counterlawfare efforts by passing legislation limit-
ing detainees‘ access to courts and declaring that detainees could not cite 
the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.51 This counterlawfare ma-
neuvering bought the Administration several more years in which the detai-
nees were denied access to the courts. It was not until the summer of 2008, 
over six and a half years after Guantánamo opened, that the Administration 
was finally forced unequivocally by the Supreme Court to allow habeas 
corpus petitions.52 Even then, the DOJ continued to use every procedure, 
gimmick, and excuse, legitimate or otherwise, to delay reaching decisions 
  
 46 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 564 (2006) (―. . .  it must be understood to incorpo-
rate at least the barest of the trial protections recognized by customary international law. The 
procedures adopted to try Hamdan deviate from those governing courts-martial in ways not 
justified by practical need . . . .‖). 
 47 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b)(4) (2009). 
 48 OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 
REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION, Ch. 9 § 9.6(a) (2007). 
 49 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b)(3)(A) (2009). 
 50 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). After Rasul, Congress attempted to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus by substituting appeals under the Detainee Treatment Act for habeas 
petitions. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that the Military Commissions 
Act was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ and that the DTA was an inadequate 
substitute. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Thus, even though Rasul seemingly granted the right of 
habeas corpus to detainees in 2004, no detainee received a review, on the merits, of their 
habeas petition until late 2008, a few months after the Boumediene decision. 
 51 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006) (this legislation also consolidated all detainee claims in the 
D.C. Circuit where it was widely believed the judges would be less sympathetic to detainees 
and more eager to embrace Administration views); 10 U.S.C. § 948b(e) (2009) (―No alien 
unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission under this chapter 
may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a basis for private right of action.‖). 
 52 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that ―aliens detained as enemy 
combatants at Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay were entitled to privilege of habeas corpus 
to challenge legality of their detention.‖). 
File: Frakt 2 Created on: 12/2/2010 6:23:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:07:00 PM 
2010]  DEMONIZATION OF THE GITMO BAR 349 
on the merits. For example, in June 2009, after taking many months to com-
pile a database about the detainees, the DOJ lawyers in my client Mo-
hammed Jawad‘s habeas corpus case, indicated that it would take months to 
search the database for relevant discovery because it was so large and un-
wieldy.53 Another technique that was both popular and effective was to 
overclassify discovery, declaring almost every scrap of information related 
to detainees to be classified or otherwise protected, forcing habeas counsel 
to utilize time-consuming and cumbersome procedures to review documents 
and submit court filings.54 These tactics ensured that the public was kept in 
the dark to the maximum extent possible, denying a public relations coup to 
the ―terrorists.‖ For example, in Mohammed Jawad‘s habeas corpus case, 
the government sought to protect information that was already clearly in the 
public domain, and, indeed, freely available in unclassified court filings on 
the DOD military commissions‘ website related to his criminal case.55   The 
Judge assigned to the case even commented that much of the information 
the government was seeking to protect could be found on the internet.56 
Another prong of the counterlawfare strategy was to invoke the 
state secrets privilege in order to degrade or deny the ability of the enemy 
(or at least those opposed to Administration policies) to pursue lawsuits 
with the alleged potential to harm our national security interests. The Bush 
Administration used this privilege extensively and more aggressively than 
prior administrations by seeking to use it, often successfully, to get lawsuits 
dismissed completely, rather than to selectively deny discovery.57    
  
 53 Resps.‘ Mot. For an Extension of Time to Comply with the Court‘s April 27, 2009 
Order, Al Halmandy v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 05-2385), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file851_39693.pdf. 
 54 I was granted a TS-SCI clearance by the Pentagon in 2008 and had the opportunity to 
review thousands of pages of classified documents in my role as defense counsel in the Of-
fice of Military Commissions from April 2008 to August 2009. Frequently, the basis for 
classifying a particular document was not clear. I gradually came to the conclusion that many 
items were classified solely because of their potential to embarrass the United States, rather 
than on the basis of any real national security concern. 
 55 Al Halmandy v. Obama, 612 F.Supp.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2009); See Mohammed Jawad - 
Habeas Corpus, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/mohammed-jawad-habeas-
corpus. I was Mohammed Jawad‘s defense counsel before the military commissions and co-
counsel on his writ of habeas corpus. See Mohammed Jawad, http://www.defense.gov/news/ 
commissionsJawad.html (demonstrating that the Department of Defense was posting on its 
website unclassified court filings relating to Jawad‘s case beginning in January 2008) (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 56 Al Halmandy v. Obama, Civil Case 05-2385 (ESH) Transcript of Hearing, July 26, 
2009, 21–22, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/jawad_transcriptofhearing. 
pdf (―Have you read the blogs on this case?  It‘s just --- everything is public. Everybody 
knows about it.‖) 
 57 For example, the state secrets privilege was used to defend against lawsuits involving 
extraordinary rendition. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 951 (9th Cir. 
2009) (―The United States government intervened, asserting the state secrets privilege and, 
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Yet another example of counterlawfare was the Administration‘s 
frequent references to the Manchester Manual, an al-Qaeda handbook found 
in Manchester, England, in 2000, which the Administration claimed in-
structed al-Qaeda members, if captured, to make false assertions of tor-
ture.58 If a weak non-state actor were to make false accusations of torture 
against its more powerful democratic nation enemy, it would be a classic 
example of lawfare. The DOD frequently cited the existence of the Manual 
(and the fact that it was found in different translations in various parts of the 
world) in support of their claims that reports of detainee abuse were manu-
factured or exaggerated, and not to be trusted.59 DOD officials also used the 
Manual to convince the American public of the need to use enhanced inter-
rogation techniques: ―There‘s a document called the Manchester Manual 
that was picked up in a search in Manchester and has surfaced in Afghanis-
tan and elsewhere. It‘s the al-Qaeda manual, basically. There is a very leng-
thy chapter on counter-interrogation techniques. These are sophisticated 
terrorists who know how to avoid interrogation.60‖ 
  
on that basis, moved for dismissal.‖), rehearing en banc granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 
2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2007) (―The United States 
moved to dismiss the Complaint, contending that its interposition of the state secrets privi-
lege precluded the litigation of El-Masri‘s causes of action.‖) cert denied, El-Masri v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). The state secrets privilege has also been used to defend against 
warrantless domestic wiretapping. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 
1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (―The government countered that the suit is foreclosed by the state 
secrets privilege an evidentiary privilege that protects national security and military informa-
tion in appropriate circumstances.‖); See Steven D. Schwinn, The State Secrets Privilege in 
the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE L. REV. 778 (2010); Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Compara-
tive Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201 (2009). 
 58 Jane Mayer, The Experiment: The military trains people to withstand interrogation. Are 
those methods being misused at Guantánamo?, THE NEW YORKER, July 11, 2005, at 60, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/11/050711fa_fact4 (―The military 
officials who run the Guantánamo prison maintain that almost all of the detainees‘ charges 
are untrue. A training manual written by Al Qaeda leaders, which is known as the Manches-
ter Manual, because a copy of it was confiscated during a 2000 raid in England, counsels 
Islamists to ‗complain of mistreatment while in prison‘ and say that ‗torture was inflicted on 
them.‘ Bumgarner said, ‗They are trained to make false accusations. It‘s part of their P.R.‘‖). 
 
59 See, e.g., Donna Miles, Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behavior at Guantanamo 
Bay, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, June 29, 2005, available at http://www.defense.gov/ 
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16270; Dep‘t of Defense, Briefing on Detainee Operations at 
Guantánamo Bay (Feb. 13, 2004), available at  http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2071 (―Some of you may be familiar with a document called the 
Manchester Manual. This was a document that was picked up in a search in Manchester, 
England and has surfaced in various other venues, including in Afghanistan. It's really the al-
Qaeda manual, and in it is a large section which teaches al-Qaeda operatives counterinterro-
gation techniques:  how to lie, how to minimize your role.‖). 
 60 Paul Butler, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, The Detainees, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june04/ 
detainees_2-13.html. 
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This counterlawfare campaign extended beyond a public awareness 
campaign and included responses to international legal institutions. For ex-
ample, the Manchester Manual was invoked in response to questions from 
the Committee Against Torture, the U.N. body responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the Convention Against Torture, about allegations of abuse 
and torture in U.S. detention facilities. According to Cully Stimson, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs at the DOD,:   
Question 8 concerns the Committee‘s interest in measures to remedy 
command and operational issues at DoD detention facilities in light of 
what the Committee describes as ―numerous allegations of torture and ill-
treatment of persons in detention under the jurisdiction of the State party 
and the case of the Abu Ghraib prison.‖ The United States would like first 
of all to address an underlying misconception that is the basis for the 
Committee‘s question. While the United States is aware of allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment, and takes them very seriously, it disagrees strong-
ly with the assertion that such are widespread or systemic. As Mr. Bellin-
ger stated in his opening remarks, these allegations must be placed in con-
text: they relate to a minute percentage of the overall number of persons 
who have been detained. Moreover, not everything that is alleged is in fact 
truth. For example, it is well-known that al Qaida are trained to lie. The 
―Manchester Manual‖ instructs all al Qaeda members, when captured, to 
allege torture, even if they are not subjected to abuse.
61
 
But were the Bush Administration officials accurately characterizing the 
Manchester Manual?  According to one commentator‘s analysis, they were 
not:  
Where the Manchester Document instructs its reader to ―ask that evidence 
of his torture be entered in subsequent legal proceedings,‖ it is not direct-
ing him to fabricate abuse claims. Written in the expectation that its re-
cruits would be detained by… enemy Arab regimes, the manual anticipates 
torture as an inevitable fact, and simply urges captives to report the treat-
ment they receive. Through the years, senior Bush administration officials 
repeatedly distorted these instructions to cast doubt on abuse claims.
62
 
If this analysis is correct, then the repeated references to the Manchester 
Manual are more appropriately described as propaganda, rather than coun-
terlawfare. 
An additional action that could be characterized as an example of 
counterlawfare was President Bush‘s unsigning of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court in May 2002, followed by an aggressive dip-
  
 61 United States‟ Response to the Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture, U.S. 
DEP‘T OF STATE, (May 5, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68561.htm. 
 62 Larry Siems, The Battle Lab, THE TORTURE REPORT, Chapter 5, Part 2,  (Sept. 03, 2010 
15:54),  http://www.thetorturereport.org/report/chapter-5-part-2-new-battle-lab. 
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lomatic arm-twisting campaign which resulted in over one hundred coun-
tries signing so-called Article 98 bilateral immunity agreements with the 
United States.63 Under the terms of these agreements, these countries, even 
those who were signatories to the Rome Statute, agreed not to cooperate 
with the ICC with regard to U.S. citizens. These actions have largely 
blocked the ability of the ICC to hold American citizens accountable (or at 
least force them to respond) for alleged war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity. The Bush Administration cited concern over meritless ―politically 
motivated criminal accusations, investigations, and prosecutions,‖ in other 
words, citing lawfare, as a primary reason for withdrawing from the treaty 
and seeking Article 98 agreements.64 
C.  Delegitimize  
When efforts to deny access to the courts fail, a final prong of the 
counterlawfare strategy could be to delegitimize enemy-sponsored efforts to 
use the law and legal institutions by directly attacking those responsible for 
filing such lawsuits. Legal expertise is required to exploit and manipulate 
the law to commit lawfare, and a lawfare strategy is only as effective as the 
lawyers who frame the legal arguments and litigate the legal claims. If the 
legitimacy of those lawyers can be effectively undermined, the force of their 
arguments can be blunted. The delegitimization of the messengers is espe-
cially important when their message is logical and forceful. 
The messages of the Gitmo bar—emphasizing themes of human 
rights, fairness, due process, the rule of law, and open and transparent gov-
ernment—were especially dangerous messages to the   Bush Administration  
because such themes resonate so profoundly with much of the American 
public and many of our allies, and also because the Bush Administration 
itself was attempting to use many of the same themes to describe its own 
policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In order to blunt these messag-
es, the messengers—the lawyers—had to be portrayed as extremist ideolo-
gues, glib silver-tongued subversives who speak the language of American 
values but secretly sympathize with the terrorists they represent. Put in mili-
tary terms, when lawyers represent legitimate military targets (detainees 
alleged or determined to be enemy combatants), then the lawyers them-
selves become legitimate military targets, or, at the very least, acceptable 
collateral damage. Of course, American lawyers cannot just be killed or 
locked up, but they can be labeled, and maligned. Thus, detainee counsel 
  
 63 Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec‘y of State for Arms Control and Int‘l Sec., to 
Kofi Annan, Sec‘y Gen. of the U.N., (May 6, 2002), available at http://amicc.org/docs/ 
bolton.pdf. 
 64 John R. Bolton, American Justice and the International Criminal Court,  26-2 DISAM 
J. OF INT‘L SEC. MGMT. 28, 29 (2003/2004) (presenting excerpts from the remarks presented 
to the American Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C., November 3, 2003). 
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should not be referred to as civil rights lawyers, human rights lawyers, Con-
stitutional lawyers, or pro bono lawyers, but as ―al Qaeda lawyers‖ or ―ter-
rorist lawyers.‖ And when you can‘t defeat them in court on the merits, then 
you can at least delegitimize them by challenging their motives, values, and 
loyalties. 
Thus, the campaign to discredit and demonize the Gitmo bar can be 
understood as a logical continuation of the broader counterlawfare strategy. 
But does that make it right? 
D.  Attacking the Gitmo Bar: Legitimate Counterlawfare? 
When one examines the nature and purposes of the detainee litiga-
tion, it is clearly inappropriate to label any of it as lawfare, and therefore 
inappropriate to fight it with counterlawfare. As I wrote in an opinion piece 
in the online journal Truthout: 
Even accepting that there may be a few actual al-Qaeda terrorists 
represented by American lawyers, if one were to review the hundreds of 
thousands of pages of legal documents filed on behalf of all the Guantá-
namo detainees by American lawyers over the last eight plus years, one 
would be hard pressed to find a single sentence that could be construed as 
pro al-Qaeda or pro-terrorism, in the sense of endorsing the al-Qaeda ide-
ology or endorsing terrorist methods. 
So, what exactly have the ―pro-terrorist,‖ ―pro al-Qaeda‖ lawyers 
been fighting for? 
In essence, the Gitmo Bar, as we detainee lawyers proudly refer 
to ourselves, fought for the restoration of the rule of law in the treatment of 
detainees . . .The bulk of the litigation on behalf of detainees has focused 
on three core principles: 
First, the Gitmo Bar fought for humane treatment for all detainees 
and against torture, cruelty and abuse. Humane treatment is the baseline 
guaranteed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions for all per-
sons detained in war, and is a basic human right. The Bush administration 
said Common Article 3 didn‘t apply. The Supreme Court said otherwise. 
Second, the Gitmo Bar fought for the right of detainees to be in-
formed of the basis for their detention and to have an opportunity to prove 
their innocence in a court of law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly af-
firmed that detainees had this right. 
Third, the Gitmo Bar fought for the right of the few detainees fac-
ing criminal charges to be tried ―by a regularly constituted court affording 
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civi-
lized peoples‖ as guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions. The Supreme 
Court agreed that detainees are entitled to nothing less, invalidating the 
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original kangaroo court, military commissions devised by the Bush admin-
istration.
65
  
Another point that must be made is that lawfare, by definition, is a 
weapon of war utilized by our enemies. The habeas corpus litigation was 
aimed at determining if the detainees at Guantánamo were even properly 
considered to be the enemy. The vast majority of detainees have been vo-
luntarily released by the United States after determining they were not (or 
no longer) enemy combatants. Among those asserted by the United States to 
be enemy combatants, the error rate has been appallingly high. As of Sep-
tember 2, 2010, the current habeas scorecard is 37-15 in favor of the detai-
nees.66 That is, 70% of the detainees to have their day in court have been 
determined not to be lawfully detained enemy combatants by federal judges, 
whose loyalty to the United States presumably is not subject to question. It 
strains credulity to label counsel for wrongfully detained men ―terrorist 
lawyers‖ or to describe their efforts to free innocent persons as ―lawfare.‖67  
As Brooke Goldstein has stated, 
Lawfare is not something that persons engage in the pursuit of justice and 
must be defined as such to have any real meaning, otherwise, we risk dilut-
ing the phenomenon and feeding the inability to distinguish between what 
is the correct application of the law on the one hand and what is lawfare on 
the other.
 68
 
The father of ―lawfare,‖ General Dunlap similarly rejected the demonization 
of the defense bar as an appropriate counterlawfare tactic in a 2007 speech: 
―To be clear, I condemn any interpretation of lawfare which would cast as 
terrorists those legitimately using the courts to challenge any governmental 
action.‖69 In a 2008 law review article, he further criticized attacks on the 
loyalties of detainee counsel: ―[T]here is no need to separate the duty of a 
patriot from that of an advocate. We believe defense counsel in virtually 
  
 65 David Frakt, In Praise of the Gitmo Bar, TRUTHOUT (March 11, 2010), http:// 
www.truth-out.org/in-praise-gitmo-bar57583. 
 66 Guantanamo Bay Habeas Decision Scorecard, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
(Sept. 7, 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/guantanamo-bay-habeas-decision- 
scorecard. 
 67 That has not stopped the most ardent critics of the Gitmo bar. See Marc Thiessen, 
Where Are the Gitmo Goatherds?, WASHINGTON POST (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/31/AR2010053101702.html 
(―Liz Cheney was right—the folks she dubbed as al-Qaeda lawyers really are al-Qaeda law-
yers.‖).Id. 
 68 Goldstein, supra note 19. 
 69 Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, Speech to ABA 17th 
Annual Review of the field of National Security Law Conference (Nov. 16, 2001). 
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every instance—military and civilian—are patriots, carrying out a vital 
function in a democracy built upon the rule of law.‖70 
Professor Luban nicely sums up the counterlawfare efforts directed 
at the Gitmo Bar: ―The lawfare idea is, fundamentally, a paranoid overreac-
tion to perfectly legitimate legal challenges to Guantánamo detentions.‖71   
V.  CONCLUSION 
While the counterlawfare concept could help to explain many of the 
Bush Administration‘s actions, the question remains whether the actions 
described above are legitimate uses of counterlawfare. One problem with 
the counterlawfare paradigm is that counterlawfare strategies and tactics are 
only appropriately applied to actual lawfare tactics by the enemy—to ab-
usive, meritless legal actions. Just as the invasion of Iraq was premised on 
the theory of preemptive self-defense, the Bush Administration‘s counter-
lawfare strategy was a preemptive one, seeking to bar all legal actions of 
any kind by the enemy before they were made or even contemplated. The 
counterlawfare weapon, as wielded by the Bush Administration, was a very 
blunt instrument, sweeping away all litigation, legitimate or illegitimate, 
without regard to its merit or source. One scholar has described the over-
reaching of the counterlawfare strategy this way: 
 
These critics [like David Rivkin, Casey, and Yoo] seem to posit that while 
the administration can and must assert the law in defense of its practices, 
others who do so thereby give aid and comfort to the enemy. They also as-
sume that any legal challenge to practices that the administration considers 
to be in the context of the war on terror is lawfare, regardless of whether or 
not the specific case arises in a situation of armed conflict.
72
  
In several instances, the counterlawfare strategy clearly backfired 
on the Administration, as it was dealt one defeat after another by the courts, 
leading to persuasive arguments by critics, such as Scott Horton, that it was 
the U.S. Government, not the detainees, who were engaged in lawfare, and 
helping to erode popular support for the war. It is simply not convincing to 
label legal efforts as ―lawfare‖ when the alleged enemy litigants are repeat-
edly victorious in the home team‘s courts, up to and including the highest 
court in the land. Indeed, one scholar argues that the Supreme Court itself 
rejected the idea of detainee litigation as lawfare.73   
  
 70 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. and Linell A. Letendre, Military Lawyering and Professional 
Independence in the War on Terror: A Response to David Luban, 61 STAN. L. REV. 417, 438. 
 71 Luban, supra note 30, at 2021. 
 72 Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law in the 
United States, 39 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 135, n.59 (2008). 
 73 Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865, 892 (2009) (―The Court 
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There is, of course, an alternative explanation for the actions of the 
Bush Administration described above. It could be argued that these actions 
were not part of a coherent counterlawfare effort—a legitimate response to 
concerns of lawfare—but rather were a response to what might be called 
―lawfear.‖ Under the lawfear theory, the Bush Administration‘s efforts to 
avoid the legal review and scrutiny of their actions that detainee and other 
war-related litigation would engender was not based on a belief that such 
lawsuits would be frivolous, abusive, distracting, and a waste of time, but 
rather the opposite. They feared discovery by zealous defense counsel and 
review by independent judges because they knew that their actions would 
not survive a searching and unbiased legal review. They did not want to 
expose the flimsy legal justifications and paltry intelligence that supported 
their actions. They feared that if lawyers (other than trusted ideologically-
compatible insiders) and courts became involved in reviewing the Adminis-
tration‘s actions in the War on Terror, they might be precluded from carry-
ing out programs which the administration considered essential as part of 
their national security strategy, for they knew that such programs were le-
gally dubious at best. They feared that domestic support for the war would 
wane if the American public knew what was really going on. They even 
feared criminal prosecution for extralegal acts that they were authorizing.  
Certainly, many senior Bush Administration officials had legitimate 
reason to be concerned about all of these things. Nevertheless, I do not be-
lieve that the lawfear hypothesis alone can account for everything. For one 
thing, the true believers in the Bush Administration have never acknowl-
edged and do not appear to believe that they did anything wrong. More to 
the point, there was definitely a concerted effort by senior lawyers within 
the Administration, especially the self-styled ―war council,‖ to develop a 
comprehensive and coherent legal strategy in the war on terror. While rea-
sonable people can and do disagree with many aspects of the legal strategy, 
it is hard to dispute that there was one.74 While the propriety of the Admin-
istration‘s overall legal strategy and whether specific actions (other than the 
inappropriate demonization of the Gitmo bar) constituted appropriate coun-
terlawfare is beyond the scope of this short Article, I believe the concept of 
counterlawfare fairly captures much of what the Administration was trying 
to do. I am hopeful that the concept of counterlawfare can be further devel-
oped in subsequent articles and that it will provide a useful analytical 
framework for developing appropriate legal strategies in future conflicts.   
 
  
decisively rejected the idea that detainee litigation itself was lawfare, as well as the notion 
that lawyers were too dangerous to be allowed to represent detainees.‖). 
 74 See David J. R. Frakt, Closing Argument at Guantanamo: The Torture of Mohammed 
Jawad, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2009). 
